AUTILOGIX

Research Foundation

The published science behind the methodology

Autilogix™ applies established findings from cognitive science, behavioral psychology, AI safety research, and consumer protection law. The sources below represent the published academic and regulatory record that informs how the platform identifies cognitive errors, reasoning failures, and deceptive patterns. This is not an exhaustive literature review — it is the working reference library the methodology draws from.

No endorsement implied

The researchers, institutions, and publications listed on this page have no affiliation with Autilogix LLC or Thalamus LLC and have not reviewed, approved, or endorsed any Autilogix™ product, methodology, or analysis output. Citations are to published works in the public record. All interpretations and applications of cited research are solely those of Autilogix LLC.

FTC and Consumer Protection

R-001

Federal Trade Commission. (1983). FTC Policy Statement on Deception. Appended to In re Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).

https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception

Primary source for the three-part deception standard applied in Arbitir™ content analysis.

R-002

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45 (Section 5). Prohibition of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act

The statutory authority cited in all FTC_LIKELY_MET determinations alongside R-001.

R-003

Federal Trade Commission. (2023). Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (Updated). 16 C.F.R. Part 255.

https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/rules/endorsement-guides-16-cfr-part-255

Updated guidance that AI-generated content must be disclosed — directly applicable to AI output analysis.

R-004

Richards, N. M., & King, J. H. (2014). Big data ethics. Wake Forest Law Review, 49, 393–432.

Documents differential treatment by user data profile as an ethical and deceptive practice concern.

AI Training, Sycophancy, and Policy Layers

R-005

Bai, Y., et al. (2022). Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback. Anthropic. arXiv:2212.08073.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.08073

Documents the Constitutional AI value encoding process — primary citation when policy layer findings fire on AI-generated content.

R-006

Ouyang, L., et al. (2022). Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. NeurIPS 2022. arXiv:2203.02155.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.02155

InstructGPT paper documenting RLHF methodology — primary citation for emergent sycophancy mechanism across all RLHF-trained models.

R-007

Perez, E., et al. (2022). Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models. DeepMind. arXiv:2202.03286.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.03286

Documents systematic patterns of AI refusal and sycophantic behavior under adversarial testing across large language models.

R-008

Sharma, M., et al. (2023). Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models. arXiv:2310.13548.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.13548

Dedicated sycophancy research — primary citation when validation bias findings fire at high severity in AI output analysis.

R-009

Casper, S., et al. (2023). Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback. arXiv:2307.15217.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.15217

Comprehensive documentation of systemic limitations in RLHF training across all large language models — including sycophancy, reward hacking, and policy misalignment as structural properties of the training method, not individual model failures.

R-010

Wei, J., et al. (2022). Emergent Abilities of Large Language Models. arXiv:2206.07682.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.07682

Documents emergent behaviors in large language models that were not designed but arose from scale — supports competence deflection analysis.

Cognitive Science — Human Reasoning

R-011

Stanovich, K. E. (2011). Rationality and the Reflective Mind. Oxford University Press.

Primary academic source on identity-protective cognition and myside bias — theoretical foundation for the human distortion taxonomy.

R-012

Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2013). Myside bias, rational thinking, and intelligence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(4), 259–264.

Peer-reviewed documentation of myside bias as distinct from general intelligence.

R-013

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

System 1 / System 2 framework — foundational source for confirmation bias and availability heuristic findings.

R-014

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.

https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185

Foundational research on how humans evaluate risk and make decisions under uncertainty.

R-015

Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge University Press.

Canonical reference for heuristic-driven reasoning failures including anchoring and representativeness.

R-016

Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(2), 57–74.

Argumentative theory of reasoning — documents myside construction as an evolved feature of human cognition, not individual pathology.

R-017

Sharot, T., Korn, C. W., & Dolan, R. J. (2011). How unrealistic optimism is maintained in the face of reality. Nature Neuroscience, 14(11), 1475–1479.

https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2949

Sharot asymmetric belief updating research — cited when cognitive dissonance management findings fire.

R-018

Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175–220.

https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175

Comprehensive documentation of confirmation bias mechanisms across contexts.

R-019

Kahan, D. M. (2013). Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(4), 407–424.

Documents identity-protective cognition — how strongly held beliefs override analytical reasoning.

R-020

Kahan, D. M. (2017). Misconceptions, misinformation, and the logic of identity-protective cognition. Cultural Cognition Project Working Paper Series No. 164. Yale Law School.

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973067

Extends identity-protective cognition to misinformation resistance — cited in motivated reasoning findings.

R-021

Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6), 1121–1134.

https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121

Dunning-Kruger effect — cited in competence calibration and overconfidence findings.

R-022

Morewedge, C. K., et al. (2015). Debiasing decisions: Improved decision making with a single training intervention. Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2(1), 129–140.

https://doi.org/10.1177/2372732215600886

Evidence that debiasing training produces measurable improvement — supports the platform's training methodology.

R-023

Sellier, A. L., Scopelliti, I., & Morewedge, C. K. (2019). Debiasing training improves decision making in the field. Psychological Science, 30(9), 1371–1379.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619861429

Field evidence for debiasing effectiveness — direct empirical support for cognitive training producing real-world improvement.

R-024

Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25–42.

https://doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196732

Cognitive Reflection Test research — cited in analytical vs. intuitive reasoning mode classification.

R-025

Stanovich, K. E. (1993). Dysrationalia: A new specific learning disability. Journal of Learning Disabilities, 26(8), 501–515.

https://doi.org/10.1177/002221949302600803

Establishes rationality as distinct from IQ — foundational to the platform's position that reasoning is a trainable skill independent of general intelligence.

Data Infrastructure and Publication Bias

R-026

Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005). Why most published research findings are false. PLOS Medicine, 2(8), e124.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124

Foundational publication bias research — cited when unattributed "studies show" claims lack replication context.

R-027

Mlinarić, A., Horvat, M., & Šupak Smolčić, V. (2017). Dealing with the positive publication bias: Why you should really publish your negative results. Biochemia Medica, 27(3), 030201.

https://doi.org/10.11613/BM.2017.030201

Documents positive publication bias mechanisms — cited in research claim analysis when negative results are structurally absent.

This reference library is maintained as a living document. Entries are never removed — only deprecated if a source is retracted or superseded. Last reviewed: 2026.